ABSTRACT Under the environment of cognitive radio networks, users are equipped with intelligent capabilities so that they can sense the conditions of networks and act optimally to maximize their revenues. Thus, dynamic spectrum access (DSA), which focuses on the management and distribution of the resources, is a critical problem, especially when only limited resources are available. Currently, this problem is handled by the game theory and auction theory, since this is a problem involving multiple agents. In this paper, we propose agent-based modeling method to model this multi-agent environment and probabilistic reinforcement learning to learn the optimal strategies. We focus on a simple scenario with only one primary user (PU) and multiple secondary users (SUs), and try to maximize the revenues of both sides, which may be further extended to other scenarios with different number of agents. First, we model this environment as a monopolistic market from the perspective of economics, where a PU acts as the monopoly and the SUs are passive buyers. Then, we propose probabilistic reinforcement learning methods to handle DSA so that both the PU and SUs can behave optimally by learning from the feedback of the others. Experimental results prove the flexibility and superior performance of our proposed methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) are advanced communication paradigms, within which agents can sense the environment and respond intelligently [1] , [2] . As one of the most important resources in wireless communication, spectrum brings great challenges to resource allocation problems. The traditional networks are controlled by a fixed spectrum assignment policy, which may be unsuitable when facing a dramatically increasing requirement for mobile services. To solve current spectrum inefficiency problems, dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is raised as the next generation program to improve the intelligence of the networks [3] .
Another explanation for such inefficiency is from the perspective of economics, whose one of the key problems is also about resource allocation. The traditional fix spectrum assignment policy is a centralized method, which is similar to the functions of governments in real markets. Governments do have the capability to allocate resources to some degree. This capability, however, is fading with the increasing number of agents. In fact, the major force in resource allocation in a market is the market power, which is motivated by the pure intention of pursuing higher profits by users. Therefore, the economic view of CRNs is to build highly intelligent users who can ideally behave as humans, so that DSA can be achieved by applying the market power in CRNs. This requires the networks having the capability to adapt or selforganize, which also motivates us to apply markets to solve DSA in CRNs.
Here, we treat the problem from a multi-agent perspective. Basically, agents in CRNs are divided into two categories, primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs), having different levels and functions in the networks. Normally, resources are contained by PUs and distributed from PUs to SUs. In this paper, we focus on a scenario where one primary user and multiple secondary users are included, as in Fig. 1 . Thus, subject to OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) fashion, SUs compete for spectrum resources provided by a PU as subcarriers. In fact, this model can be extended to other situations. Therefore, we ignore details of OFDM and focus on the interactions between inhomogeneous agents.
FIGURE 1. The environment of one primary user (PU) and multiple secondary users (SUs).
Two approaches are popular to handle this decision-making problem: game theory and auction theory. The former focuses on the behaviors of agents, whereas the latter emphasizes resource allocation. The application of reinforcement learning (RL), whose expertise is in dealing with decision-making problems [4] , has similar intentions [5] , [6] . Compared to the basic ABM, the simple rules are enhanced into intelligent policies that can guide them to learn optimal behaviors, leading to the maximum revenues. In other words, RL is a practical tool to solve the problems in computational economics and auction theory.
In this paper, we treat SUs and PU as intelligent agents and embed them with reinforcement learning methods, introducing a probability scheme to allow that the bidding of SUs be comparable to the prices designed by a PU. In other words, SUs and PU have the capability of learning by interacting with the environment. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We have modeled the one-PU multiple-SUs scenario as a monopolistic market, according to economic knowledge;
• We have defined users' preferences to indirectly guide their behaviors, which defines the roles of each user in this market;
• We have proposed a dual-learning paradigm, where both the PU and SUs can interact and learn instead of focusing on the learning process of one side;
• We have proposed probabilistic reinforcement learning methods to handle such environments that have the capability of generating a vector of actions, instead of a single value. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, some related works will be discussed. Details of the monopolistic model for CRNs are discussed in Section III, and the corresponding solution, namely probabilistic reinforcement learning, is presented in Section IV. Experimental results are in Section V and the final section concludes the whole paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
DSA can be regarded as a particular type of resource allocation, which is widely studied in telecommunications as well as in economics [7] , [8] . Here we only consider a simple situation, where only one PU and several SUs exist. For advanced scenarios, such as device-to-device (D2D) communications [9] and pervasive social networking (PSN) [10] , the quantity and roles of PUs and SUs may be considered. That is, node detection is the first step, since the interactions and responses may depend on the types of nodes. The internet of things (IoT) [11] and the internet of vehicles (IoV) [12] are other growing fields with multiple agents, aiming to establish an intelligent system allowing communication among devices or vehicles.
Complication also grows in quality besides quantity. More types or layers of users, other than PUs and SUs, may be required. Thus, more attention should be paid to agent detection and the taxonomy of the agents, i.e. to establish a reasonable standard to classify all the agents. Furthermore, social activities may be involved in such networks, leading to the social internet of things (SIoT) [13] , the social internet of vehicles (SIoV) [14] , or even a social vehicle swarm [15] if they are able to perform swarm intelligence. Conclusively, we are dealing with a decision-making problem under a multi-agent situation.
Game theory provides a mathematical tool to analyze the behaviors or the strategies of PUs and SUs, which is applicable for a variety of fields [16] . The basic idea is to extract the main features from real environments to establish a model or a game. For instance, according to different situations, games extracted from DSA problems can be classified as non-cooperative games [17] , cooperative games [18] , stochastic games [19] , and economic games [20] , Then games theory is applied, whose solutions are useful and applicable in real problems. Other related study also covers the overlay spectrum access [21] , energy efficiency [22] and oT connectivity in radar bands [23] .
The auction theory originates from economics, which establishes a natural competitive environment [24] . Based on the number of sellers and buyers, demand auction, supply auction, and double auction are the main types of auction models. The basic rule in auction models or price schemes is that if the quantity of the demand exceeds that of the supply, the prices increase; otherwise they drop. This explanation is two-fold. On one hand, sellers have incentives to control prices, if they have market power, so that their revenues are maximized. On the other hand, the prices determine the behaviors of buyers as whether they accept the prices or quit the market. For a monopolistic market, no substitute goods or markets exist, meaning the only option for buyers is to accept the prices passively and unwillingly. One popular solution is agent-based modeling, providing a computational solution [25] . With the assistance of computational intelligence, we can simulate each agent according to basic rules and observe the outcomes of the systems as a whole or their individual behaviors.
The relationships among RL, game theory, and auction theory are subtle. Games are natural platforms that are used to verify the flexibility of RL. Currently, the most outstanding achievement is AlphaGo [26] , which has exceeded the performance of humans, beating the champions in the game of Go. Meanwhile, stochastic games are established on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [27] , which is highly dependent on the theories of RL. From the perspective of game theory, auction models are also games, which can be solved using RL. It seems the most outstanding advantage of RL is that RL relies on fewer assumptions than game theory. That is, normally applying game theory to solve these problems contains two stages. Firstly, a game, which contains the most significant aspects and ignores complex details, is abstracted from the real problem, after its the intrinsic feature being studied and analyzed. This process is done by introducing several assumptions, such as rationality or common knowledge. The second stage is to solve this game and apply the solution backwards to the original problem. This, however, may restrain its capability and flexibility. RL requires no such assumption as a constrain. With well-defined stages, actions and rewards, RL is capable of solving a variety of games. Meanwhile, it can interact directly with real world, such as playing chess, thus abstracting and establishing games seems unnecessary.
RL can be applied directly to PUs and SUs, so that they can learn directly from the environment. Also, RL can be used to solve games after they are established by game theory or the auction theory, which is an indirect approach to DSA for RL. Meanwhile, another advantage of RL is that it can handle dynamic scenarios and take future rewards into consideration [28] . Solving resource allocation problems with RL methods seem to be a novel promising direction [29] , [30] .
Even though more advanced RL methods exist, such as deep reinforcement learning (DRL) (which is capable of continuous control [29] and feature extraction from raw pixels for human-level control [30] ), PRL is enough for our problem. One instance is applying DRL to solve dynamic multichannel access [31] . By saying enough, we mean that it is unnecessary to apply DRL here. Because the most outstanding aspect of deep learning is feature extraction, which is necessary in some complicated scenarios, such as computer vision. Our model has relatively simple inputs, thus feature extraction is unnecessary. DRL, however, may be a promising solution for other complicated DSA situations, such as when multimodal data are involved.
III. MONOPOLISTIC MODEL FOR COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
Networks are natural environments with multiple agents or nodes. With the emergence of CRNs, the capabilities of agents have improved from passive responses to positive behaviors, which means they can ask for resources, instead of waiting for being assigned. Thus, we are lured and motivated to study the behaviors of these nodes when they have the capability to choose their own actions.
A highly intelligent and sophisticated multi-agent environment is a market, where buyer and seller try to behave optimally so that their revenues can be maximized. Inspired by economic theories and methods, we regard the environments of CRNs as markets, supported by intelligent nodes. Under this market, SUs and PU interact and learn from feedback, as in Fig. 2 . Each SU bids for spectrum resources, and the PU receives all bids and comprehensively decides whether to accept them or not. Meanwhile, it learns from the bids to adjust the prices for all the sub-channels to maximize its profit. On the other hand, the outcomes of the bids being accepted by the PU are fed back to the SUs. Then, they learn to change their policies so that their payoffs can increase. After convergence, both the SUs and the PU may reach an equilibrium where their profits are maximized. Therefore, in this section, we will discuss this analogy, along with the behaviors of the SUs and the PU. 
A. MARKET MODEL ANALOGY
From the perspective of economics, this interaction and activity among multiple users is a natural market. Thus, some problems, such as resource allocation and social behavior studies, can be solved using ideas from economics, which is VOLUME 6, 2018 one key motivation for computational economics [32] . Based on the quantity of sellers and types of products, four major market structures, namely monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition, and perfect competition exist [8] .
Compared to the DSA problem, the number of PUs and SUs may be reflected by different market structures. When two or only a few PUs are involved, an oligopoly is the most suitable structure. In this scenario, the limited resources are contained by a small quantity of PUs, and the market power is also distributed among them. Therefore, the behaviors of them are restrained by the actions of others. In fact, this is the most popular structure being studied in game theory, such as Prisoners' Dilemma, or a double-auction model [33] .
If the number of PUs is large, then the structures of monopolistic competition and perfect competition are taken into consideration. If PUs are providing different products, for instance, they are designed for some particular channels, then a monopolistic competitive market should be chosen. For a more social situation, a perfect competitive market seems to be more realistic and practical, since the boundary between the PUs and SUs is blurred and every node could be a potential seller or buyer.
Since our environment contains only one PU and several SUs, the most suitable market structure is the monopolistic market [8] , where a PU is the monopoly and SUs are the competitors. SUs are buyers who are competing for the product, the spectrum, by bidding on and paying the prices designed by the PU. We focus on their learning processes so that the maximum revenues can be achieved. Both SUs and the PU have the capability of learning from the environment, which is affected by the actions of others. Because of the contract to the markets with many sellers, where prices are determined by the natural force in market (namely the market power), the prices in a monopolistic market are determined by the monopoly alone and they are usually higher than the market prices, since the monopoly has incentives to increase his profit.
In economic markets, governments consider monopolies to be problems. In our networks, however, we ignore the roles of governments and policymakers since we have direct access to control the PU. If the monopolistic prices are too high, we can manually decrease them without making any new policies, the process of which is usually not so efficient. This is because in economic theory, a natural force, the invisible hand, is responsible for adjusting prices so that the resources can be allocated to those who desires most. When the economic policies are raised by governments, some accidents may occur, which disagrees with the intention of governments. For instance, governments intend to eliminate the drug markets, and they issue anti-drug policy. This decreasing of drugs, unfortunately, may increase the prices of them, since they are difficult to obtain and become luxury, increasing the benefits of drug markets and attracting more people for entry, which is the exact opposite of governments' intention [8] . Therefore, sometimes it may be a wise choice to leave markets to adjust by itself, instead of introducing extra force, let along the complex progress of issuing a new policy.
Next, we will discuss the detailed behaviors of the SUs the and PU under the monopolistic market.
B. BEHAVIORS OF SUs
As mentioned previously, SUs are buyers in this monopolistic market. Mathematically, N SUs (S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N }) are competing for the spectrum resources in C subchannels. Each SU can take several subchannels but each channel can only be assigned to one SU.
The preference of each SU is defined as a set of probabilities over all subchannels, as
. The bids SUs offer are highly related to their preferences, since preferences stand for the willingnessto-pay. Thus, if this preference is accessible, then the bids can be obtained directly by some policy function, as B t = π (I ). This, however, is inappropriate, since the true preferences are very subtle. In fact, bidders have no direct access to their true preferences, otherwise there is no any confusion or regrets about decision making. The only possible options for bidders are to sample and to estimate their true preferences by interactions with the PU, which is the intrinsic motivation of trialsand-error methods when we discover the uncertainty. In other word, we can approximately apply the estimated preferenceÎ , instead of the true preference I . Further, we measure the dissimilarities between the true and estimated preferences to evaluate the performance of our estimation, which will be discussed later.
Thus, the strategy for SUs is to choose the channels and values to bid. Let a binary vector A t = a t 1 , a t 2 , . . . , a t C , (a t i ∈ {0, 1}) denote the set of choices of channels at time t. Bids are obtained by the dot product between the choices and the estimated preferences, which is considered as the sample process, as
We denote R t s i ,j as the revenue of SU s i on channel j. Thus, if the bid exceeds the price, p t j , and bids from other SUs, s k , the trade is a success and the winner with highest bid obtains the revenue of occupying the subchannel. Mathematically, the revenue of SU is
where p t j is the price of channel j at time t, and b t s i ,j refers the bid from user S i on channel j at time t. The first condition ensures the winning bid higher than the price, and the second condition ensures a channel can only be taken by one SU at most. Thus, the target of each SU is to maximize the revenue, leading to a more intelligent policy to guide its choices. Notice that we define all bids within the range [0, 1], thus the revenue is a nonnegative number for winner bids, preventing bidding all the channels.
Notice that we have been avoiding the concept of competition or cooperation among the SUs. In fact, the relationships among the SUs are decided by their preferences. That is, one of the intrinsic reasons why competition occurs is the unmatched quantity of resource and demanders. For instance, at current moment, air is unlimited resource thus no one is competing for it, even it is critical for humans. However, if only limited air remains, the price of purchasing air will be increasing, respect to the increasing quantity of demanders. Therefore, if two individuals share similar preferences, which means they are demanding for the same channel, they have a higher probability of competition. Otherwise, they have no conflict. Thus, they are either cooperating or staying neutral, because they have relatively abundant resources and less competitors. Since the preferences of the SUs decide whether they are competing, the clarification of classifying SUs as either competition or cooperation, as the common taxonomy, seems unnecessary. SUs in competition models may not be strictly competitive, intrinsically. Therefore, we have been avoiding the assumption of competition models.
C. BEHAVIORS OF PU
Most research only focuses on the behavior of SUs where only one PU is considered. Since CRNs bring the capability of intelligent behaviors for nodes, PUs also have the opportunity to sense the environments and react wisely. From the perspective of the PUs, the bids from the SUs are their payoffs. Since only one PU is involved, there is no competition among all PUs. The only PU, addressed as the monopoly, has all the monopolistic market power. Thus, it can design the prices for all subchannels.
Similar to that of the SUs', the goal of the PU is also to maximize its payoffs. To achieve this target, the PU can choose the prices for each subchannel. If the prices are too high, no SU can bid successfully, the trade fails, and the PU obtains nothing from the trade. If the prices are too low, the profit is not optimal, since the PU could have gained more.
As mentioned previously, the prices of all subchannels are defined as P t = p t 1 , p t 2 , . . . , p t C . Theoretically, the condition p t i ∈ [0, 1] is unnecessary for the definition of prices. We, however, intend it to be comparable with the estimated preferenceÎ in the SUs, so the condition is applied. In fact, PU can only focus on the highest bids on each channel, since each channel can only be assigned to one bidder. Therefore, we denote b t h,j as the highest bid on channel j, which is obtained by comparing all bids on that channel from all SUs. Thus, the payoffs or revenue of the PU are defined as
Notice that the payoffs are always nonnegative, because if b h,j < p t j , the PU can prevent losing profits by aborting the trade based on the assumption of constant marginal cost. The goal of the PU is to maximize its total revenue accumulated over all channels, as
Therefore, the strategy of the PU is based on the value of R t PU ,j . If some subchannel is non-profitable, then the price of this channel should decrease, since it may have always exceeded the maximum bid. Decreasing the prices may increase the probability of successful trades, which further increases the total revenue indirectly. If some subchannel is beneficial, as R t PU ,j > 0, then the price of this channel can increase gradually and carefully for a higher revenue. If the price jumps, the trade may fail and some R t PU ,j will be zero, having a negative influence on the total revenue.
The intrinsic problem for both the SUs and the PU is the decision-making, which is the expertise of RL. In the following section, we will present the details of applying PRL methods to solve the monopolistic model extracted from the CRN.
IV. PROBABILISTIC REINFORCEMENT LEARNING FOR DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS
Being one of the three categories of machine learning, RL specializes in handling the decision-making problems which usually establish an MDP. The most distinguishing feature of RL is the application of rewards (rather than labeled data), which is inspired by psychology. Agents can learn a certain behavior during the process of maximizing their accumulated rewards. These methods, however, are not comparable with the preferences of the SUs, which are represented as a probability distribution. Therefore, we turn to the consideration of probabilistic reinforcement learning, which applies a probabilistic scheme to control the actions.
The temporal difference (TD) method is a popular category in RL, which calculates the differences between the current state and the next state. Q-learning [4] , one of the TD methods, seems to be the most popular off-policy method. It applies a Q value that evaluates each state-action pair to guide the action, a, as a = f (Q (s, a) ), where s is the state and f (Q) is a decision function. The Q values for each state-action pair are updated as
Here, α is the learning rate and γ is the discount factor, so that the Q value for current state-action pair Q (s, a) is comparable to that of a future state-action pair Q s , a . r is the reward obtained. Thus, those state-action pairs leading to higher rewards will be reinforced, and their corresponding Q values will increase.
Applying the Q-learning method directly is feasible [27] , but not so efficient. Consider a scenario with C subchannels where 2 C − 1 states and actions are involved, making the Q value a matrix of size 2 C − 1 × 2 C − 1 . Operating on such a huge matrix is inefficient. Therefore, we propose probabilistic Q-learning (Pro.Q), which is independent on this inefficient operation. VOLUME 6, 2018
A. PROBABLISTIC REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
States are significant concept in MDP, as the condition of decision making. Meanwhile, the transferring functions from one state to another link all the states. In our model, however, the transferring relationships between states and actions are not strict. In fact, any future state is accessible from any current state when certain actions are taken. Thus, the concept of states seems to be less meaningful. Therefore, we tend to perform the stateless version of Q-learning, as
where A t donates the set of bidding on channels. The original Q values, however, are not probabilistic. Therefore, we applied the softmax function to convert them to a probabilistic form, as
where q (a) is the value in Q for action a and τ is a temperature parameter controlling the sharpness of this probability distribution. That is, we apply Pr Q as the estimated preferenceÎ to control the actions of SUs. The dissimilarities between Pr j Q andÎ will be measured later. Thus, we only keep a Q value of the size 1 × C, which greatly reduces the complexity and increases the efficiency, compared to the size 2 C − 1 × 2 C − 1 from traditional Q-learning. Another efficient, yet not so popular, method in RL is called learning automata (LA) [34] , which provides a probability scheme Pr t LA = q t 1 , q t 2 , . . . q t C for choosing actions. Again, we apply Pr LA as the estimated preferenceÎ , and their dissimilarities between will be measured in the next section. If a bid from some SU s i is taken by PU, indicating a successful trade, then the probability of choosing this subchannel j at time t should increase, as
For bids not being accepted, the probabilities of choosing the corresponding subchannels are updated in opposite directions, as (assuming subchannel k fails the trade)
where q t s i ,j is the probability of choosing action a i at time t. λ 1 and λ 2 are the reward and penalty parameters, which are functional as learning rates and regularization parameters. Furthermore, the values of λ 1 and λ 2 also control the category of LA methods, namely the Linear Reward-Penalty (L R−P ), Linear Reward-ε Penalty (L R−εP ), and Linear Reward-Inaction (L R−I ), when λ 1 = λ 2 , λ 1 λ 2 , and λ 2 = 0, respectively [34] . In our model, fortunately, similar outcomes are reached by all three categories. Therefore, we just apply L R−I as a representative.
The reason why we apply LA as a comparing is because it is one of the state-of-the-art RL method for independent learners in stateless games [34] . Meanwhile, it naturally has a probabilistic scheme to control its actions, which has a high similarity to our proposed method. Thus, comparing LA is reasonable.
One major problem in RL is the exploration-exploitation trade-off. Pure exploitation ensures that agents stick to their optimal choice in the current state, and exploration encourages agents to discover other potentially superior choices. In PRL, however, this problem is automatically covered. Each action is chosen according to its corresponding probability, where the possibility of exploration is ensured. Then, because the actions with higher probabilities are more likely to be selected, the capability of exploitation is guaranteed. During the learning process, the actions targeting higher rewards will be reinforced, thusly, agents can reach a maximum after convergence.
We apply the capability of learning to both the SUs and the PU, so that they have the possibilities to learn the optimal actions and to reach their maximum rewards during their interactions.
B. LEARNING PROCEDURE OF SUs
Here, we present the details of learning methods for SUs. As mentioned previously, each SU competes for spectrum resources by bidding on the subchannels. In other words, the action, a s i , for some SU, s i , is a sequence of {0, 1}, and the probability of selecting 1 is based on the PRL model, Pro.Q and LA in this case.
The bids are fed to the PU, so that the PU can choose to accept or refuse some bids, according to the current prices of the subchannels. If the bids exceed the prices, then they are accepted. Otherwise, they are rejected, resulting in a failed trade.
Dissimilar to some current methods [28] , our environment involves both the learning processes of the SUs and the PU, thus, their results interact with and affect each other. Therefore, the rewards for the SUs are the feedback from the PU, instead of being obtained directly. After the PU chooses the survival bids by comparing the highest candidate bids with current prices, only the survival bids are used to update the corresponding Q values by (6) or the probabilities of the LA methods by (8) and (9) . The pseudo code of the SUs' learning procedure is illuminated in Algorithm I. Notice that Line 7a is the updated rule of Pro.Q method and Line 7b is that of LA, thus they are parallel rather than sequential procedures.
Next, we will discuss the learning procedure of the PU, which absorbs the outputs of Algorithm I and learns to design the prices optimally.
C. LEARNING PROCEDURE OF PU
The learning procedure of the PU is also based on RL, with some dissimilarities in Pro.Q and LA. The most distinguished fact is that prices are not probabilities. Initially, we randomly generate the prices within the range [0, 1], so that they are comparable with bids. The prices alter with the learning process, and the final outcomes of the prices seem unpredictable. Obtain the reward R t s i ,j A t based on (2) 7a.
Update Q based on (6) 7b.
Update Pr t LA based on (8) and (9) 
End
Nevertheless, the basic strategies that a PU uses to update prices are straightforward. When the bids are sent to the PU, the PU is only looking at the maximum values for each subchannel and comparing them with the current prices, as b t h,j − p t j . If the result is negative, denoted as pa t −,j , then the trade of that subchannel fails because the prices are high. Reducing the prices to increase the possibility of a successful trade seems reasonable, as in (10) .
For our simplified purpose, we assume the marginal cost of the spectrum remains constant, thus, the minimum possible value the prices can be set to is zero, as P t = max P t , 0 . On the other hand, for the successful bids, denoted as pa t +,j , which means the bids exceed the current prices, their corresponding prices can be increased carefully and gradually so that the maximum profits can be improved. Notice that increasing the prices rapidly may cause the trade to fail. Therefore, we clip the rewards to be the maximum value of bids, which is the largest upper boundary when learning, ensuring the efficiency of accepting the bids, as in (11) .
The pseudo code of the PU learning procedure is illuminated in Algorithm II, whose input is the bids from Algorithm I and whose output, the updated prices P t , is fed to Algorithm I to guide the learning for the SUs.
The following section will present the simulation results of our method, along with a detailed discussion.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we will present and discuss our simulation results. Our experiments are performed on a Window 10 operating system (Intel(R) Core TM i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz 2.71GHz). Our methods have no restrict requirement of simulation environment.
Under this monopolistic model, we are interested in the outcomes for both the SUs and the PU. One straightforward 
5.
If pa t j > 0, mark the channel j as pa t +,j ; otherwise mark as pa t −,j . 6.
Obtain the reward R t PU ,j based on (3) 7.
Update the prices P t pa t −,j based on (10) 8.
Update the prices P t pa t +,j based on (11) 9. End quantity in RL is the averaged revenues that agents have received. In our model, we have tracked the revenues for each SU and PU separately. The error bars of the averaged revenues received by the PU are presented as in Fig. 3 , which demonstrate the mean values over 40 runs and the standard deviation. Other parameters are summarized in Table 1 . Both learning curves in Fig. 3 have an increasing trend. The blue one, which referring to the revenues obtained by Pro.Q, has converged, after about 400 iterations, to a relatively higher value, about 1.2. Meanwhile, the red one, obtained by VOLUME 6, 2018 LA, is increasing slowly. The PU in the Pro.Q method obtains more revenues than with LA method, which can indicate the superior efficiency of Pro.Q over LA, because the main purpose of agents is to obtain the maximum revenues. This superiority of Pro.Q may be achieved by its higher efficiency of learning. LA method updates only one value after one episode whereas Pro.Q can update a vector, which accelerates the velocity of learning.
Since several SUs are involved in our model and their revenues are different and based on their individual preferences, the learning curves for the revenues of them are different. Fortunately, their trends are similar. Therefore, we average the revenues over all SUs, as in Fig. 4 , where both the Pro.Q and LA methods are applied as a comparison. Both curves are in Fig. 4 have the similar trend, converging to the same value with a comparable velocity, which means both methods are suitable for the learning process of the SUs. Notice that the value they have converged to is different from that in Fig.3 . This is because we have set the revenue of PU and SUs differently. The revenue of PU is the natural summation of all bids greater than the prices. SUs, however, receive a revenue of 1 − b t s i ,j if they win. Therefore, their revenues have an upper boundary 1. Thus, we might draw the conclusion that both methods are applicable for SUs to learn their optimal behaviors.
Next, we calculate the efficiency of bidding, which is defined as the rate of successful bids. The ideal scenario for SUs (not necessarily for the PU) is that the rate equals one, indicating all bids are accepted, thus efficient. The results from both methods are presented in Fig. 5 . It is obvious that both curves can improve the efficiency in our model, except that Pro.Q can lead to a more superior outcome. Another reason why we have examined the efficiency is that since we have no upper boundary of revenues of PU, we cannot judge if PU has reached to its optimal actions. Therefore, we apply efficiency as an upper boundary and a measurement to referring this optimality.
One interesting fact is that, the trends in Fig. 5 is similar to those in Fig. 3 , indicating the efficiency has a high correlation with the revenue of PU. As mentioned previously, PU cannot only raise the prices to increase the revenue being received on certain subchannels directly but can also decrease the prices on the subchannels where the trades have failed, so that more successful trades can be encouraged. Both actions aim to increase the total revenue of the PU. From Fig. 5 , we find that the efficiency of bidding is high, which means almost all bids are accepted by the PU, indicating that both methods prefer the strategy of lowing the prices to increase the number of subchannels being accepted.
Furthermore, we measure the dissimilarities between Pr Q and I , and Pr LA and I . As mentioned previously, in our model, we have no direct access to the true preferences I of SUs. Thus, we can only apply an estimated preferenceÎ to control the behaviors. That is, we are suing A = π Î , rather than A = π (I ). In Pro.Q method, we are applying Pr Q asÎ , whereas in LA, we are applying Pr LA instead. Here, we define the dissimilarity as
Thus, we can measure the dissimilarity between the estimated preferences and the true ones, as in Fig. 6 . These dissimilarities indicate the performance of estimating the true preferences of the SUs. The curves obtained by Pro.Q remain at a low level, indicating that the estimated value is close to the true value, inferring the efficiency of the proposed method. That from LA, however, is converged to a relatively high level, indicating some error of estimation. That is, we may draw the conclusion that we have estimated the true preferences with a low error by sampling with them instead of applying them directly. This disagreement may be caused by the more optimal choices for the PU, namely the opportunity of increasing the prices, which also increases the dissimilarities.
All the experimental results presented previously are based on an assumption that the environment is stable during this whole learning process. Now, we propose a long-term result with dynamic environments, with respect to the revenues of PU, as in Fig. 7 . The dynamic environments are designed by applying a novel preference at certain iteration, at every 1000 th iteration in Fig.7 . That is, we manually change the preferences of SUs. Another method is parameterizing the preferences and altering these parameters intrinsically, which is our future study. Notice that we have not provided results for SUs. This is because these curves for SUs are no longer similar. Since the preferences of all users change, some SU may be the new winner or loser in some channels. Therefore, some may increase and some may drop. As a result, it is meaningless to plot the averaged figures.
We can find that when preference alters, a drop exists instantly in the curve with LA method. That is reasonable, because previous policy does not fit current preference, and this mismatching leads to an immediate decreasing in the revenue of PU. After some iterations, however, the curve climes back to their previous level. On the other hand, the curve for Pro.Q stays in a relatively high position and is less affected by the preference alter. This is because LA itself is a natural probability scheme but the Q value is not. Thus, when preference alters, this negative impact on revenue causing direct changes in Pr LA , but indirect changes in Pr Q . The converting from Q to Pr Q may dilute this negative impact, making Pro.Q relatively more stable to the alter of preferences. In other words, both Pro.Q and LA methods are able to solve this dynamic environment, which means agents can learn the optimal choices with them.
As a conclusion, both Pro.Q and LA, can solve the monopolistic market under the CRN, even though Pro.Q may have a relatively superior outcome. Future work may focus on discovering more sophisticated probability RL methods, such as Bayesian RL, to increase the revenues for both the PU and SUs. It might be a united method or specialized methods designed for PU and SUs separately. Meanwhile, other environments with corresponding models should also be considered, such as the oligopolistic model for scenarios with multiple SUs and a few PUs, along with the consideration of parameterizing the preferences of users.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed probabilistic reinforcement learning methods to handle the dynamic spectrum access problems in cognitive radio networks. Firstly, we have considered our environment, involving only one primary user and multiple secondary users, as a monopolistic market, from the perspective of economics with market structure analysis. Then, we have proposed learning paradigms for both the PU and SUs. After the PU and SUs interact and learn from the feedback of the others, based on our probabilistic reinforcement learning methods, their individual revenue can be maximized. Finally, experimental results prove the flexibility of our methods. Future work will extend our methods to other scenarios in cognitive radio networks. MOHSEN GUIZANI (S'85-M'89-SM'99-F'09) received the bachelor's (Hons.) and master's degrees in electrical engineering and the master's and doctorate degrees in computer engineering from Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA, in 1984 USA, in , 1986 USA, in , 1987 USA, in , and 1990 
